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LEGAL ETHICS AND THE LAW SCHOOLS
What Leaders of Movement for Teaching Professional Ethics in the Law Schools Really
Have in Mind Is That These Schools Make Some Intelligent and Wholehearted At-
tempt to Develop Professional Character-What Can Be Done in This Direction
by Such Institutions-Bad Effect of Narrow Point of View of Much
Teaching in the Past, Etc.
BY BERNARD C. GAVIT
Professor, Indiana University School of Law
UE primarily to the insistence of the Sectionon Legal Education of the American Bar As-
sociation there is a growing and compelled
interest in the problem of the teaching of Legal
Ethics in the Law Schools.
No small part of the apparent lack of interest,
opposition and unwillingness to co-operate dis-
played by most of the schools can be explained by
calling attention to the fact that there is an unusual
amount of confusion which arises out of the lan-
guage used in the campaign. "Legal Ethics" usu-
ally connotates the subject matter contained in the
Canons of Professional Ethics, and may it be said
in behalf of the Law Schools that experience has
demonstrated that that subject matter is not worth
much of the students' and the instructors' time. As
has been often pointed out the Canons deal primar-
ily with "Ethics" in a very narrow and restricted
sense: they are directed at the problem of profes-
sional politeness: they constitute the form of pro-
fessional conduct and not its substance. It is true,
of course, that they also contain some very general
cautionary instructions on the subject of Trusts
and Agency as applied to the legal profession: sub-
jects on which the ordinary student however has a
rather specialized knowledge in any event.
But it is increasingly apparent that the leaders
of the movement for the teaching of Legal Ethics
have something else in mind. Unfortunately they
have employed misleading language. What they
really want is not that the law schools devote more
time to the teaching of the rules of Professional
Ethics, but that they make some intelligent and
whole-hearted attempt to develop Professional
Character. The thing which concerns the Bar to-
day is not that the new generations of lawyers do
not have a familiarity with the rules of professional
conduct, but that they fail when put to the test of
the temptations and the ideals of the profession.
And it is always true that it is not a verbal knowl-
edge or belief which determines conduct, but a will
and a character which compel it. The first can be
developed to the point of perfection, but without a
development of the latter there is nothing but the
semblance of permanent accomplishment. The dis-
tinction is between the law school graduate who is
simply a repository of legal knowledge and one
who is actually professionally minded and "char-
actered."
So far the law schools have for the most part
been content to deal exclusively with the scholastic
attainments of their students. But the growing in-
sistence by the American Bar Association that the
results are frequently undesirable illustrates that
the scholastic standard is too narrow, and is often
misleading in a fair appraisal of the fitness of the
graduate for professional practice. Can the schools
do anything about it?
II
If we but appreciate the obvious truth that
character is a result rather than a means or an end
it is clear that they can. It has, of course, been
amply demonstrated that to attempt to develop
character by teaching or preaching it produces a
minus quantity in results. The problem is one of
substance rather than of superficial emotion. And
on the whole it may well be admitted that the prob-
lem is an extremely difficult one and one upon
which varying solutions might well be offered and
tried. And, too, no one should be so foolish as to
expect to appraise the results on the basis of any-
thing other than experience. No Bar Examination
can be devised which will test them.
But to me it seems patent that the Bar Asso-
ciation is justified in demanding that the Law
Schools re-examine themselves in the light of this
additional purpose and that they must give up the
scholastic standard as the only criterion for gradu-
ation. They must broaden their purposes to in-
clude this result.
If that is done it would follow that there must
be a reappraisal of both the form and substance of
legal education. Character in an attorney is a com-
plex thing: it is a summation of many desirable
qualities and characteristics. But a thorough
knowledge of legal rules and legal technique, how-
ever large it may seem to bulk when measured by
quantity standards, is but one of them. We must
not, however, minimize its importance, no matter
how much we emphasize the importance of other
attributes. But even as to these latter knowing
and doing are to begin with somewhat o-existen-
sive, and so to start with there must be not only a
knowledge of legal rules, but also a knowledge of
the function of a lawyer.
We need pay little attention to the function of
a lawyer as it affects his own selfish individual
ends. His background and his environment will
amply take care of that. The thing is summed up
in the common expression that "a lawyer must first
of all make a living." That, however, must be
taken with a ton of salt, for in the final analysis, the
real quarrel here is.with the ideas embodied actu-
LEGAL ETHICS AND THE LAW SCHOOLS 327'
ally and inferentially in the expression. The sole
possible valid distinction between a business and a
profession is whether the purpose asserted and
acted upon is one primarily of making a living, or
of doing a work of social consequence from which
results a living. If one is in business he is in busi-
ness for gain, and the fact that some slight or great
social service may result from his activities is of no
concern to him; he has but to hew to the line, and
let the results take care of themselves. But if one
is really engaged professionally in a profession,
gain is a secondary result and neither a primary
purpose or result. If the quotation above be cor-
rected it should read: "A lawyer must last of all
make a living." The change is not at all disastrous,
for under our present economic set-up the living
results more or less inevitably, and sometimes even
in some liberal proportions.
In other words a profession is socialized: a
business is individualized. -A profession sets up
ideals of conduct which go beyond the immediate:
it attempts to appraise the social consequences of
professional conduct: and it is organized for the
avowed purpose of improving and enforcing the
ideals of the group. Thus it is that one who is de-
frauded by a lawyer rightly complains to "the Bar,"
and "the Bar" must continue to accept responsibil-
ity for its ideals and its practices. Once it ceases to
do that it becomes a business organization and not
a professional one.
But one can be justly alarmed at the extent to
which the non-professional idea has invaded the
Bar. The action of the Section on Legal Educa-
tion is therefore timely and reasonable. Because
certainly it is not necessary to produce any argu-
ments to sustain the validity of the professional
ideal as applied to the administration of justice. Its
very purpose is a social advantage, and one has
only to observe the present business depression to
learn what a failure the Bar would be were it to
abandon a socialized and professional ideal in favor
of a strictly business and individualized point of
view. The business of an attorney is truly affected
with a public interest in no small degree, and we
can always profit by instruction which emphasizes
that fact, and all of its consequences. And certainly
no one need apologize for insisting upon the main-
tenance of the highest ideals and purposes for the
legal profession. We need give them no meta-
physical content, for as a pragmatic proposition it
is impossible to operate any enterprise without
some rather definite purposes previously deter-
mined upon. That they go beyond the immediate
and advance into the field of the ideal is after all a
practical advantage, at least when one is dealing
with an enterprise which is so closely associated
with a governmental and social function as is the
legal profession. III
And, of course, the real truth is that regardless
of whether or not there has been a conscious pur-
pose on the part of those engaged in legal education
to develop professional character, the professional
character of law school graduates has inevitably
been practically if not wholly determined by their
law school experience. Whatever the law school
does has a result in the lives and characters of its
products. And it is sadly true, as the present move-
ment indicates, that the cheapness, the narrowness,
the metaphysics, the formalism and the bread and
butter nature of much law school instruction has
produced negative results in professonal character.
Once we assume that an attorney owes any
duty to the courts and the public generally (in
other words that he is a prospective leader in the
administration of justice and other governmental
functions) a broad and tolerant point of view is a
first requirement. It is a serious indictment of the
form and substance of legal education that it has
been dedicated to the reactionary and conservative
maintenance of the status quo, rather than to a tol-
erance of change and proposed changes which is
the very genius of democratic government. When-
ever you teach a young man that there is a meta-
physical content to The Law you have temporar-
ily, at least, incapacitated him from acquiring that
tolerant point of view. Metaphysics is an unneces-
sary handicap to social progress, and the law
schools ought to divorce themselves from it.
In the more narrow field of an attorney's repre-
sentation of his client the same thing is true. The
late Dean fames P. Hall defined "legal reasoning"
as "that ability to analyze complicated facts, to
reduce instances to principles, and to temper logic
with social experience." Too often the latter re-
quirement is overlooked. Courts are constantly re-
framing legal assumptions to conform to the mo-
dern viewpoint, and the average losing lawyer re-
gards the result as a startling, illegal innovation-
"wrong on principle." He forgets, or probably does
not know, that that procedure is a necessary and
proper portion of the judicial function. -Tad he
stopped to temper his logic with social experience
he could probably have foretold the adverse result
and saved his client much time and money. A great
many things which were "true" fifty years ago are
not "true" today.
But primarily that is not his fault. He has
been taught that the previous assumptions and all
of their logical inferences were "the law" which
could be changed only by an act of the legislature.
The result is simply this, that while it has often
been said by high authority that a "lawyer must be
conservative, else he is no lawyer," the opposite is
the more correct postulate. It is no good trying to
insist on anything but a scientific outlook in the
field of the law, or in any other of the social sci-
ences. It is increasingly apparent that what we do
not "know" about social, political and economic ex-
istence almost equals-if it does not exceed-what
we do not "know" about the physical universe.
Law school instruction whose form or sub-
stance tends to produce a non-tolerant, non-scien-
tific outlook in the character of its product has
given to the legal profession a member who is han-
dicapped in the proper discharge of both his private
and public obligations He is a stumbling block and
not a creative power in social progress. His char-
acter has the wrong, and a disastrous bent.
The law as conceived and taught in the past
has a narrowing influence. But a broadening influ-
ence can be found. The broader and more tolerant
views in any field and individual are the result of
more (broader and deeper) knowledge and specu-
lation. Law school training quits too soon. (And
undoubtedly, too, it begins too late, and not at the
beginning.) It quits when it has prepared a fairly
competent workman, and before there is much of
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an opportunity to produce a fairly competent pro-
fessionally-ininded attorney. A deeper and broader
understanding of law and the functions of Law can
come only through competent instruction in the
field which is commonly called Jurisprudence.
Without it your student operates upon his own
narrow assumptions and postulates. His legal
philosophy is thus home-made.
When we realize that his own narrow assump-
tions and postulates are to form the motive and
guiding power for his supposedly professional ca-
reer we perceive that there is here a serious defi-
ciency in his character. He lacks both the profes-
sional ideal and the equipment with which to ac-
quire or attain one. It is apparent that if there is
to be any course of study required for graduation
it is a thorough course in modern Jurisprudence.
It may well be that that calls for an increase in
the time allotted to law school education. It is in-
creasingly obvious that although you can develop a
fairly competent workman and scholar in three
years you cannot also develop a reasonably com-
petent attorney in that time. There is need for
ripening, and most of our ills can be attributed to
the fact that so far we have been unwilling to give
to the project the time necessary for that result.
IV
While much can be said against the narrow
point of view from which the substantive law is
dished out to the law school student, more can be
said against the system when the adjective or pro-
cedural law is concerned. Here for some reason or
other it seems particularly true that the product
feels himself dammed as a lawyer unless he be re-
actionary. A proposed change in the substantive
law can sometimes escape without arousing the av-
erage lawyer to white-heat, but no proposal con-
cerning a modification of the law of procedure can
escape that result. In a field where the only pos-
sible criterion is a practical one there is the most
metaphysical viewpoint in the average lawyer. Cer-
tainly something can be done in the teaching of the
procedural subjects to produce the pragmatic view-
point.
And, too, something can be done to improve
the uses to which the law of procedure is put in
practice. Much of our difficulty in the proper dis-
position of the trial work of courts arises out of the
fact that the lawyer has never been taught that
during the pleading stage of the proceedings he is
strictly an officer of the court and not an advocate ;
that all of the rules of procedure are made to be
observed by lawyers and not broken if one can get away
with it. The student mind can undoubtedly be
properly disciplined on that subject with very bene-
ficial results.
V
Some suggestions have been made above as to
possible remedies. What any given law school
ought to undertake is a matter which will have to
be left to the individual school. Dean John H.
Wigmore described, in an address at the Atlantic
City Meeting, what the Northwestern University
Law School has been doing. The address will be
published in all events in the report of the proceed-
ings of the meeting, so that there is no occasion to
do more than call attention to it,
It is reasonably clear that despite the adver-
tised overcrowding of the Bar there will continue
to be an increased effort on the part of young men
and women to become lawyers. A business career
is now less attractive than ever before, and there
will for a time at least be a decided drift to the pro-
fessions as a more desirable prospect. It is all to
the good; for it means that the Schools and Bar
Examining Boards will have more material than
ever from which to choose. It will make possible,
too, a training and a choice on the basis of profes-
sional character as well as scholastic attainment.
Public opinion will support a law school course of
four years, and a general raising of scholastic and
character requirements. The Bar of this country is
faced with its first real opportunity to be a Bar in
the best sense of that word, and it is well that both
the Bar and Schools immediately emphasize char-
acter training as ar obvious but necessary means
of reaching that end.
Against Unseemly Demonstrations in Court
T HE Executive Committee of the Cleveland Bar
Association has adopted a resolution condemn-
ing demonstrations in court rooms when verdicts
favorable to defendants in criminal cases are re-
ceived. The resolutions, as made public by Presi-
dent Walter L. Flory of the Association, read as
follows:
"WHEREAS, The President of The Cleveland
Bar Association has called the attention of the
Committee on Legal Ethics and of this Committee
to the fact that demonstrations of an unseemly
character now ard then take place in our court
rooms upon the returning of the verdict of the jury,
especially in criminal cases where a verdict of ac-
quittal is returned; and
"WHEREAS, It is of the highest importance in
the administration of justice that proper decorum
in the court room be at all times maintained, and
that all personal considerations should be sub-
ordinated to the view that judges and juries are
serving the public and not any particular part
thereof;
"RESOLvED, That it is the opinion of this Com-
mittee that any acts or demonstrations by any per-
sons involved in the administration of justice which
tend to create the impression that either the court
or the jury have rendered a personal service, are
reprehensible. These acts include thanks publicly
rendered by successful litigants to the members of
the jury or to the court whose decision has been
favorable to them."
The Executive Committee took action on the
subject following a report of the Committee on
Judiciary and Legal Reform in which such demon-
strations were condemned and the Judges of the
Court of Common Pleas were asked to adopt a
Rule of Court or fixed practice preventing them in
future.
